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Introduction  
Adversarial machine learning is the systematic study of how motivated adversaries can compromise 
the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of machine learning (ML) systems through targeted or 
blanket attacks. The problem of attacking ML systems is so prevalent that CERT, the ​ federally 
funded research and development center tasked with studying attacks, ​ issued a broad vulnerability 
note on how most ML classifiers are vulnerable to adversarial manipulation.  Corporations and 1
governments are paying attention. Google,  IBM,  Facebook,  and Microsoft  have committed to 2 3 4 5
investing in securing machine learning systems. The US is putting security and safety of AI systems 
as a top priority when defining AI regulation,  with the EU releasing a complete set of non-binding 6
checklists as part of its Trustworthy AI initiative.   7
Research in this field is booming. Since 2014, more than 2,000 papers have been posted in arXiv.  8
Researchers used adversarial ML techniques to identify flaws in Facebook’s micro-targeting 
1 ​https://kb.cert.org/vuls/id/425163/​ (noting “Machine learning classifiers trained via gradient descent are 
vulnerable to arbitrary misclassification attack”) 
2 ​https://ai.google/responsibilities/responsible-ai-practices/?category=security​ (“​Safety and security entails 
ensuring AI systems behave as intended, regardless of how attackers try to interfere.​”)  
3 ​https://www.ibm.com/cloud/architecture/architectures/securityArchitecture/watson-security 
4https://spectrum.ieee.org/tech-talk/artificial-intelligence/machine-learning/facebook-ai-launches-its-deepfake-
detection-challenge​ (“​...Facebook’s AI Red Team, which analyzes the threats that AI poses to the social 
media giant​”)  
5 ​https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/security/engineering/securing-artificial-intelligence-machine-learning 
(noting “​AI designers will always need to ensure the confidentiality, integrity and availability of sensitive data, 
that the AI system is free of known vulnerabilities, and provide controls for the protection, detection and 
response to malicious behavior against the system or the user’s data”) 
6https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/Draft-OMB-Memo-on-Regulation-of-AI-1-7-19.pdf 
(noting “When evaluating or introducing AI policies, agencies should be mindful of any potential safety and 
security risks, as well as the risk of possible malicious deployment and use of AI applications”)  
7 ​https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/ethics-guidelines-trustworthy-ai​ (noting “​AI systems need 
to be resilient and secure. They need to be safe, ensuring a fall back plan in case something goes wrong, as 
well as being accurate, reliable and reproducible. That is the only way to ensure that also unintentional harm 
can be minimized and prevented​”) 
8 ​https://nicholas.carlini.com/writing/2019/all-adversarial-example-papers.html​ (see txt file containing all 
papers) 
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algorithm.  In an instance of perturbation attack, researchers were able to veer Tesla’s self-driving 9
system off the highway via simple stickers.  These kinds of attacks are particularly prevalent 10
against defensive tools developed by the cybersecurity industry. For instance, researchers were 
able to trick the ML system powering Cylance, a commercial antivirus engine, into misrecognizing 
ransomware as benign software.   In another example, two security researchers bypassed 11
Proofpoint, a commercial email protection, by first copying the underlying ML model and 
brute-forcing it offline, then launching an online attack crafting emails that escaped the system. This 
became the first vulnerability that was exploited on an ML system to be entered into the National 
Vulnerability database.   12
This research is not without legal risks. Studying or testing the security of any operational system 
potentially runs afoul the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA),  the primary United States 13
federal statute that creates liability for  hacking.  Originally enacted as a narrow law in 1984, it has 14
subsequently been expanded, with new prohibitions added in the years since.  The broad scope of 15
the CFAA has been heavily criticized, with security researchers among the most vocal.  They 16
argue the CFAA--with its rigid requirements and heavy penalties--has a chilling effect on security 
research.  Adversarial ML security research is likely no different.  17
However, prior work on adversarial ML research and the CFAA is sparse. In a 2018 article, Ryan 
Calo et al. explored adversarial attacks under the CFAA but only examined three classes of 
adversarial ML attacks (evasion, poisoning, and data inversion).  Other relevant published 18
commentary is similarly limited. For instance, one recent paper examined only evasion and 
poisoning attacks,  while another considered perturbation, extraction, and poisoning attacks but did 19
not examine important inconsistencies in how courts have applied relevant CFAA provisions.  We 20
do so here. 
There are two goals for this paper. For legal practitioners, we describe the complex and confusing 
legal landscape of applying the CFAA to adversarial ML. For adversarial ML researchers, we 
describe the potential risks of conducting adversarial ML research. We also conclude with an 
analysis predicting how the US Supreme Court may resolve some present inconsistencies in the 
9 ​Faizullabhoy, Irfan, and Aleksandra Korolova. "Facebook's advertising platform: New attack vectors and the 
need for interventions." ​arXiv preprint arXiv:1803.10099​ (2018). 
10 ​Xi, Bowei. "Adversarial machine learning for cybersecurity and computer vision: Current developments and 
challenges." ​Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Computational Statistics​: e1511. 
11 ​https://skylightcyber.com/2019/07/18/cylance-i-kill-you/ 
12 ​https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-20634 
13 18 U.S.C. § 1030. 
14 Kossoff, Jeff. (2019). Cybersecurity Law (Wiley, 2019) at 172. 
15 Orin S. Kerr, ​Vagueness Challenges to the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act​, 94 Minn. L. Rev. 1561, 1561 
(2010);​ ​Kossoff 172-173.  
16 Kosseff 212-213.  
17 Kosseff 213.  
18 Calo, Ryan, et al. "Is Tricking a Robot Hacking?." University of Washington School of Law Research Paper 
2018-05 (2018);  
19 ​Shankar Siva Kumar, Ram, et al. "Law and Adversarial Machine Learning." ​arXiv preprint arXiv:1810.10731 
(2018). 
20 Natalie Chyi. (2020)​. ​Examining the CFAA in the Context of Adversarial Machine Learning. 
https://www.legaltechcenter.net/a-i/commentary/ 
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CFAA’s application in ​Van Buren v. United States​,  an appeal expected to be decided in 2021. We 21
argue that the court is likely to adopt a narrow construction of the CFAA, and that this will actually 
lead to better adversarial ML security outcomes in the long term.  
CFAA and Adversarial ML 
We consider two CFAA sections particularly relevant to adversarial machine learning. First, 
intentionally accessing a computer “without authorization” or in a way that “exceeds authorized 
access” and as a result obtains “any information” on a “protected computer” (section 1030(a)(2)(C)). 
Second, intentionally causing “damage” to a “protected computer” without authorization by 
“knowingly” transmitting a “program, information, code, or command” (section 1030(a)(5)(A)). These 
are both criminal prohibitions, but the CFAA also includes a private right of action. This allows any 
person to sue if they have incurred damages or losses due to a CFAA violation, including these two 
provisions.  These sections do not exhaust the potential liabilities under the CFAA, but do cover 22
the most common adversarial ML attacks.  
Intentional Access Without or Exceeding Authorization -- Section 1030(a)(2) 
The CFAA has been inconsistently applied. Case law on its interpretation has been described as 
“fragmented”  and “unclear,”  with courts “expressing uncertainty and confusion”.   One of the 23 24 25
most contentious inconsistencies is section 1030(a)(2)(C)’s interpretation, which prohibits anyone 
who “intentionally accesses a computer without authorization” or “exceeds authorized access,” and 
“thereby obtain information from any protected computer.”  On a few points, courts have generally 26
agreed. They have interpreted the term “protected computer” very broadly. For example, it includes 
any computer connected to the internet.  They have also generally found that “without 27
authorization” means access without permission to do so. However, on the meaning of the term 
“exceeds authorized access,” there are significant disagreements. The language applies to insiders: 
users that already have authorized access to a computer system -- such as a user sending query 
requests to an ML system -- but who do something to ​exceed​ that authorization in accessing any 
information on the computer. 
What constitutes exceeding authorized access? There is presently a 4-3 split among the circuit 
courts of appeals in the United States. (For non-lawyers, the federal circuit courts cover particular 
regions of the country, and govern interpretation of the law by federal trial courts in those areas in 
the absence of a Supreme Court ruling.) The First, Fifth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits, which 
21 Van Buren v. United States, 940 F.3d 1192 (11th Cir. 2019), petition for cert. filed (U.S. Dec. 18, 2019) (No. 
19-783) (pending decision on appeal). 
22 Id. § 1030(g) 
23Michael J. O’Connor, ​The Common Law of Cyber-Trespass​, 85 Brook. L. Rev. 421, 422 (2020) 
24Orin S. Kerr, ​Vagueness Challenges to the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act​, 94 Minn. L. Rev. 1561, 1562 
(2010). 
25Orin S. Kerr, ​Norms of Computer Trespass​, 116 Colum. L. Rev. 1143, 1145 (2016)​. 
26 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2)(C). 
27 ​United States v. Kramer,​ 631 F.3d 900, 902 (8th Cir. 2011) (noting the definition of “computer” is 
"exceedingly broad," and concluding an ordinary cell phone is a computer); ​United States v. Nosal (Nosal II), 
844 F.3d 1024, 1050 (9th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 314 (2017) (noting “protected computers” 
include “effectively all computers with Internet access…”) 
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include Illinois, Massachusetts, and Texas, have adopted a broader interpretation, finding that 
“exceed authorized access” includes accessing information on a computer system for an “improper 
purpose,” which usually means breaching some agreement, policy, or terms of service. Some 
examples have included accessing account information of another user that the accused was not 
managing or supervising. Another example would be a departing employee downloading company 
information contrary to confidentiality agreements or violating network use or access policies. For 
the purposes of our analysis below, we will refer to this as the “broader interpretation” of 1030(a)(2).  
By contrast, the Second, Fourth, and Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeal, which include New York and 
California, have adopted a narrow construction of the term. They have held that simply accessing 
information for an improper purpose, without more, does not constitute a section 1030(a)(2) 
violation. Rather, a person only “exceeds authorized access” if they are prohibited from accessing 
information for any reason.  In practice, on this more narrow interpretation, a defendant “exceeds 
authorized access” when a user (i) had access to a computer system; (ii) their authorized access 
was limited to certain information on the system; and (iii) the user bypasses or circumvents a 
“technological access barrier” or “code-based” restriction to access additional information.  For the 28
purposes of our analysis below, we will refer to this as the “narrow interpretation” of 1030(a)(2).  
The remaining circuit courts have not ruled definitively on this question. So there are some regions 
in the country employing a narrow interpretation; some regions employing a broader interpretation; 
and some remaining regions where this interpretive issue has not yet been addressed, creating a 
confused and uncertain state of affairs for how the CFAA is applied across the country. The 
fragmented nature of the existing law is visualized in the following map (​Figure 1​): 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
28 See ​Brenda Sharton et al., “Key Issues in Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA) Civil Litigation”, ​Practical 
Law (Thomson Reuters) ​1, 4 (2018) (summarizing the narrow reading); ​United States v. Nosal I, ​676 F.3d 
854, 863-864 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc) (“​his narrower interpretation is also a more sensible reading of the text 
and legislative history of a statute whose general purpose is to punish hacking — the circumvention of 
technological access barriers — not misappropriation of trade secrets”). Kosseff at 175 (“A narrow reading of 
the statute might lead to the conclusion that you only violate the CFAA if you commit a code-based violation”). 
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Figure 1:  Differing CFAA Interpretation By Circuit Court Region 
 
This confusing state of affairs may come to an end soon as the US Supreme Court has an 
opportunity to address these inconsistencies in ​Van Buren v. United States​.  We discuss this case 29
and its connections to adversarial ML in the final part of this paper. 
Intentional Access Without or Exceeding Authorization -- Section 1030(a)(5) 
Section 1030(a)(5)(A) prohibits anyone from “knowingly” transmitting a “program, information, code, 
or command” and thereby intentionally causing “damages” to a “protected computer.” Unlike section 
1030(a)(2)(C), this applies to outsiders and insiders equally. Though the CFAA does not define 
“transmission,” courts have generally held that it can occur over the internet or through a physical 
medium, such as a USB stick.   For liability, a person must not just knowingly transmit, but also 30
intentionally damage the protected computer. The CFAA defines “damage” as including “any 
impairment to the integrity or availability of data, a program, a system, or information.”   31
29 Van Buren v. United States, 940 F.3d 1192 (11th Cir. 2019), petition for cert. filed (U.S. Dec. 18, 2019) (No. 
19-783) (pending decision on appeal). 
30 Meridian Fin. Advisors, Ltd. v. Pence, 763 F. Supp. 2d 1046, 1061-62) (S.D. Ind. 2011)). 
31  § 1030(e)(8). 
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Denial-of-service (DOS) attacks -- where code or commands are sent over the internet or another 
medium, and overwhelm or disrupt the receiving system -- have also been prosecuted under this 
section. Other examples include sending malicious code, including trojans or viruses; code that 
deletes emails on the recipient’s computer; code sent over a radio communications network used 
for first responder communications that intentionally interfere with those normal operations​;  and 32
bulk or mass emails that overwhelm the receiving system, disrupting normal business operations.   33
How the CFAA Affects Adversarial Machine 
Learning Research 
Since its enactment, the CFAA has been applied to researchers who study operational systems. 
The exceptionally broad scope of both sections 1030(a)(2)(C) and 1030(a)(5) has implications for 
adversarial ML researchers -- and security researchers in general -- who may face criminal and civil 
liability for unauthorized access to a computer. Research on operational systems generally involves 
probing, or even breaking into, those systems. This includes those with permission to access a 
system as a legitimate user, whose access may be governed by terms of service. Merely testing in 
ways contrary to the terms of service, without anything more, could mean the researcher has 
exceeded authorized access and has violated the CFAA. The CFAA’s severe penalties means such 
findings could have a chilling effect on security research.  Additionally, the circuit court split on the 34
interpretation of section 1030(a)(2)(C) means that the extent of risk depends on the jurisdiction in 
which a CFAA claim may be adjudicated. 
In this section, we illustrate how these CFAA provisions impact adversarial machine learning 
research more specifically. We assume a paid service that provides its users a machine learning 
service (say, image recognition). Users interact with this system by submitting a query, and 
obtaining the classification result (see ​Figure 2​): 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
32 United States v. Mitra, 405 F.3d 492 (7th Cir. 2005) (also finding a radio system is a computer). 
33 Pulte Homes, Inc. v. Laborers’ Int’l Union of N. Am., 648 F.3d 295, 301 (6th Cir. 2011). 
34https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2014/may/29/us-cybercrime-laws-security-researchers​; 
https://www.eff.org/wp/protecting-security-researchers-rights-americas  
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 Figure 2:  Black Box Setup 
 
 
For our analysis, we assume that the attacker has no direct access to the training data, has no 
knowledge of the algorithm, and no knowledge about the features used in the algorithm. The 
attacker is also assumed to be a legitimate user of the system and their use of the system is 
governed by these rules, which are based on Google API’s Terms of Service (TOS).   35
 
Under those terms, users ​shall not​: 
1. Reverse engineer or attempt to extract the source code from any API or any related 
software, except to the extent that this restriction is expressly prohibited by applicable law 
2. Interfere with or disrupt the APIs or the servers or networks providing the APIs 
3. Scrape, build databases, or otherwise create permanent copies of such content, or keep 
cached copies longer than permitted by the cache header 
4. Copy, translate, modify, create a derivative work of, sell, lease, lend, convey, distribute, 
publicly display, or sublicense to any third party 
5. Misrepresent the source or ownership 
Assuming this common setup, in the next section we consider a range of adversarial ML attacks in 
light of the CFAA, including taking into account the circuit split on how section 1030(a)(2)(C) should 
be interpreted. For clarity, though we often offer examples of each broad class of different 
adversarial ML attacks for illustrative purposes, our analysis aims to address how these CFAA 
35 ​https://developers.google.com/terms  
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provisions would apply to each broad class of different adversarial ML attacks, as opposed to a 
single instance of the attack. We also plot our analysis in ​Figure 3​. 
 
Exploratory Attacks: Attacks that only send queries and observe responses  
 
Evasion Attack 
In evasion attacks, the attacker is able to modify the query to get any response that they desire, 
without bypassing the components behind the ML API. For instance, researchers were able to add 
specific noise to X-rays, which tricked an ML system into misclassifying abnormal X-rays as normal.
 In the model evasion attack affecting Cylance antivirus engines, the researchers simply appended 36
benign code from an online gaming repository to malicious ransomware, which caused the ML 
system to misclassify the code as benign software.   37
 
Such attacks are unlikely to raise liability concerns under either section 1030(a)(2) or 1030(a)(5)(A). 
For the former provision, there is no section 1030(a)(2) violation on the narrow interpretation of 
“exceeds authorized access” because no technological access barrier or authentication gate is 
circumvented with the queries. The ML system is only tricked into providing an incorrect response. 
But there is also no violation under  a broader interpretation, either, as this attack does not breach 
the TOS: no reverse engineering, scraping, or creation of a derivative work. Liability under section 
1030(a)(5)(A) is also unlikely. Even assuming the query constitutes a transmitted “program, 
information, code, or command” there are no “damages” within the meaning of the term. There is no 
“impairment” to the “integrity” or “availability” of the system or any related data,  as there is no 38
“destruction, corruption, or deletion of electronic files”, “physical destruction” of the system, nor “any 
diminution in the completeness or usability of the data on a computer system.”   39
  
 
Model Stealing 
With model stealing attacks, the adversary is able to create a copycat version of the underlying ML 
model by strategically querying the model and observing the response, thereby recreating the 
intellectual property. For instance, researchers were able to recreate deep neural nets hosted by 
ML as service providers, such as Microsoft, Face++, IBM, Google, and Clarifai, that were not only 
accurate (accuracy >80%), but also cheap to mount (cost less than $3).  One approach to model 40
stealing is by using the existing ML API as an oracle; that is, the attacker makes sufficient queries 
over all the classes of the ML model, observes the response, and from the (query, response) pairs, 
learns a new function.  41
 
36 ​Paschali, Magdalini, et al. "Generalizability vs. robustness: investigating medical imaging networks using 
adversarial examples." ​International Conference on Medical Image Computing and Computer-Assisted 
Intervention​. Springer, Cham, 2018. 
37 I.d. 11 
38  § 1030(e)(8).  
39  ​TriTeq Lock & Sec. LLC v. Innovative Secured Solutions, LLC, Civ. Action No. 10 CV 1304, 
2012 WL 394229, at 6; Kossoff at 197-198. 
40 ​Yu, Honggang, et al. "Cloudleak: Large-scale deep learning models stealing through adversarial examples." 
Proceedings of Network and Distributed Systems Security Symposium (NDSS)​. 2020. 
41 ​Tramèr, Florian, et al. "Stealing machine learning models via prediction apis." ​25th {USENIX} Security 
Symposium ({USENIX} Security 16)​. 2016. 
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With respect to section 1030(a)(2), on a narrow interpretation there is likely no violation for this 
attack because no technological access barrier or code-based restriction is circumvented. Queries 
are merely sent and inferences made based on observed responses. However, there may be a 
violation on the broader interpretation of 1030(a)(2), which will turn on how broadly a court 
interprets the relevant TOS governing the ML system and the insider user. On one hand, it would 
seem unlikely that a court would find that information that is ​inferred ​from legitimate query 
responses could be prohibited by TOS and lead to CFAA liability. On the other, as with the TOS we 
assume here, such ML use restrictions and policies often prohibit reverse engineering or creating 
databases based on query responses, even legitimate ones. So, it is ​possible​ a court would find a 
model stealing attack as an attempt to “reverse engineer” the model’s “source code,”  contrary to 
Clause 1 of the TOS, which, as noted, are fairly typical terms of use or service. It might also 
constitute creating a “derivative work,” also contrary to TOS Clause 4. 
 
However, no section 1030(a)(5)(A) violation is likely here because, as with evasion attacks, the 
“damages” requirement is not met. There is no  “impairment” to the “integrity” or “availability” of the 
system or any related data.  
 
Model Inversion and Membership Inference 
In model inversion attacks, attackers ​infer sensitive information about the private training data. One 
paper showed how, with even a black box access to the ML model used in personalized medicine, 
attackers could recover the private genetic markers of patients who were part of the training data.  42
These kinds of attacks were later expanded to the ML API setting, wherein researchers showed 
how attackers could exploit the confidence intervals revealed in responses to reconstruct the 
features used in the private training data.  Such attacks raise serious concerns, given that training 43
data usually contains privacy-sensitive information.  44
 
In membership inference attacks, the adversary is able to ascertain if a data point was part of the 
training data by strategically querying and observing the response. For instance, in a model trained 
on hospital discharge data and hosted in ML APIs such as Google Prediction API, researchers 
showed how attackers could use this technique to reconstruct the private information of participants 
who were part of the training data (such as the procedure the patient underwent) through simple 
generic information such as participant’s age and gender.  
 
 
 
 
42 ​Fredrikson, Matthew, et al. "Privacy in pharmacogenetics: An end-to-end case study of personalized 
warfarin dosing." ​23rd {USENIX} Security Symposium ({USENIX} Security 14)​. 2014.  
43 ​Fredrikson, Matt, Somesh Jha, and Thomas Ristenpart. "Model inversion attacks that exploit confidence 
information and basic countermeasures." ​Proceedings of the 22nd ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer 
and Communications Security​. 2015. 
44 ​Zhang, Yuheng, et al. "The secret revealer: generative model-inversion attacks against deep neural 
networks." ​Proceedings of the IEEE/CVF Conference on Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition​. 2020. 
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 Figure 3:  Chart Visualization Adversarial ML Legal Risks  
Attack Description 1030(a)(2) Violation? 
(Narrow Interpretation 
by Second, Fourth, 
and Ninth Courts)  
1030(a)(2) Violation? 
(Broad Interpretation 
by First, Fifth, 
Seventh, and 
Eleventh Circuit 
Courts) 
 
1030(a)(5)(A) 
violation 
Evasion Attack Attacker modifies the query 
to get appropriate response 
No No No 
Model Inversion Attacker recovers the 
secret features used in the 
model by through careful 
queries 
No Possible No 
Membership 
Inference 
Attacker can infer if given 
data record was part of the 
model’s training dataset or 
not 
No Possible No 
Model Stealing Attacker is able to recover 
the model by constructing 
careful queries 
No Possible No 
Reprogramming 
the ML System 
Repurpose the ML system 
to perform an activity it was 
not programmed for 
No Yes Yes 
Poisoning Attack Attacker contaminates the 
training phase of ML 
systems to get intended 
result 
No Possible Yes 
Attacking the ML 
Supply Chain 
Attacker compromises the 
ML models as it is being 
downloaded for use 
Yes Yes Possible 
Exploit Software 
Dependencies 
Attacker uses traditional 
software exploits like buffer 
overflow to confuse ML 
systems 
Yes Yes Yes 
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Again, no​ section 1030(a)(5)(A) violation is likely here because there is no “impairment” to the 
“integrity” or “availability” of the system. A section 1030(a)(2)(C) violation is also unlikely on the 
narrow interpretation because no technological access barrier or code-based restriction is 
circumvented, only inferences based on query responses. However, the broader interpretation is 
trickier. As with model stealing attacks, a broader interpretation of the CFAA will also rely on how 
broadly a court interprets the TOS. A court may conclude that this is access for an improper 
purpose, and thus exceeds authorized access, as it constitutes “reverse engineering” the model’s 
“source code,”, contrary to the TOS. A court might also find ​inferring​ information about training sets 
or membership constitutes a step involved in “building” a database, contemplated by the TOS 
prohibitions in Clause 3. If so, this would likely constitute a CFAA violation. 
 
 
Reprogramming the ML System 
In this attack, the adversary is able to force the model to perform a task that the creator did not 
intend to do so by sending special queries. For instance, researchers  demonstrated how 45
ImageNet, a system used to classify images into different categories, was repurposed to count 
squares. The authors of the paper explain how this attack could lead to abuse of ML systems: for 
instance, an attacker might want to create spam accounts but be impeded by CAPTCHA images 
that need to be solved. Using the reprogramming attack, the attacker could repurpose the image 
recognition system used in cloud-hosted photo storages to solve CAPTCHAs and therefore remove 
the impediment.  
 
Here, there would be no section 1030(a)(2) violation if narrowly interpreted because, again, no 
technological access barrier has been bypassed. A broader interpretation could lead to a different 
conclusion, as this could certainly constitute an interference or disruption of the ML system contrary 
to Clause 2 of the TOS, as the integrity of the ML system is compromised. This attack also raises 
liability concerns under section 1030(a)(5)(A), as the special queries also constitute “code” or 
“commands” that are knowingly and intentionally “transmitted” to the ML system. As well, the attack 
causes an “impairment” to the “integrity” or “availability” of the ML system.  This would constitute a 
prima facie​ violation. 
 
Attacks that taint the training data: 
Poisoning Attack  
In order to adapt to possible shifts in the underlying data distribution, ML models are often retrained 
on the outputs that were generated by the model itself and the associated feedback from the user. 
For instance, in a spam classification setting, every time a user provides feedback to the model if 
the mail was incorrectly classified, the response is sent to the underlying models and retrained. This 
feedback channel, wherein the response is folded back into the training data, can be exploited by 
attackers to poison the training data. The canonical example is Microsoft’s Tay chatbot, which used 
the responses generated by Tay’s interactions with users as training data. Within 24 hours of its 
45 ​Elsayed, Gamaleldin F., Ian Goodfellow, and Jascha Sohl-Dickstein. "Adversarial reprogramming of neural 
networks." ​arXiv preprint arXiv:1806.11146​ (2018). 
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release, Microsoft had to decommission it, since trolls from the internet exploited this feedback 
channel, resulting in Tay sharing racist comments and images.   46
 
On a narrow reading, there is likely no section 1030(a)(2) violation, as no technological access 
barrier or authentication gate is bypassed in the attack. However, the attack arguably interferes with 
or disrupts the ML system’s operations, contrary to Clause 2 of the TOS, so there may be liability on 
a broader interpretation. 
 
 
This attack likely constitutes a section 1030(a)(5)(A) violation, as the queries are likely “code” or 
“commands” knowingly “transmitted” to the ML system. And the commands, by corrupting and 
“poisoning” the ML system, are very likely a form of “damage” within the meaning of the section in 
that it impairs the “integrity” or “availability” of the ML system.  This is a ​prima facie​ violation. 
Attacks on underlying environment:  
Attack ML Supply Chain 
In these classes of attack, the attacker ​subverts the machine learning system by tampering with the 
source code, build processes, or update mechanisms. Currently, there is a trend in using pretrained 
models in NLP and computer vision wherein ML models trained on gigantic generic datasets and 
powerful computers are made available to the public for task-specific customization.  Researchers47
 showed that attackers could mount a man-in-the-middle attack as these models are being 48
downloaded for use, or simply insert malicious code in the public repository where the models are 
hosted.  
 
This attack raises liability concerns under both sections. If the attack involved compromising 
technological security or access barriers in order to compromise the ML supply chain, this would 
constitute access “without authorization” for outsider attackers, and for insiders, it would also 
“exceed authorized access” on either a broad or narrow interpretation. Bypassing code-based 
restrictions and compromising source code on a protected computer without permission or 
authorization are classic cases of computer hacking prohibited under section 1030(a)(2), whether 
on a narrow or broad reading.  
 
A section 1030(a)(5)(A) violation is also probable, depending on how the attack is carried out. If  a 
technological barrier was bypassed, then it is likely a “code” or “command” was knowingly 
“transmitted” to the ML system, and as a result of this action, the “integrity” or “availability” of the ML 
system, via its supply chain, is “impaired.”  This is also a ​prima facie​ violation. 
 
46 ​https://blogs.microsoft.com/blog/2016/03/25/learning-tays-introduction/​ (noting that ​“Unfortunately, in the 
first 24 hours of coming online, a coordinated attack by a subset of people exploited a vulnerability in Tay. 
Although we had prepared for many types of abuses of the system, we had made a critical oversight for this 
specific attack. As a result, Tay tweeted wildly inappropriate and reprehensible words and images”)  
47 ​https://huggingface.co/calculator/  
48 ​Gu, Tianyu, Brendan Dolan-Gavitt, and Siddharth Garg. "Badnets: Identifying vulnerabilities in the machine 
learning model supply chain." ​arXiv preprint arXiv:1708.06733​ (2017). 
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Exploit Software Dependencies 
Here the adversary, instead of attacking the training data, model, or probing via queries, attacks the 
underlying infrastructure on which the ML system is built. For instance, researchers  showed how 49
attackers could exploit the unpatched vulnerabilities in popular ML packages like numpy and 
tensorflow, and violate confidentiality, integrity, and availability guarantees.  
 
This attack also likely leads to liability on both counts. Exploiting software vulnerabilities in the ML 
system would violate section 1030(a)(2) because it would mean technological access barriers are 
bypassed without authorization or exceeding authorization, causing damage or loss. Similar to our 
reasoning concerning attacks on the ML supply chain, either a narrow or broad interpretation leads 
to the same conclusion here. 
 
Again, depending on the nature of the attack, there may be liability under section 1030(a)(5)(A) as 
well. If a technological barrier was bypassed using exploit code, then it is likely a “code” would have 
been knowingly “transmitted” to the ML system, ultimately impairing the ML system’s “integrity” or 
“availability”. This, too, would be a ​prima facie​ violation.  
 
Van Buren ​and Future Directions 
Our analysis has attempted to navigate significant inconsistencies in how the CFAA has been 
applied. Some of these interpretive issues may be settled in the US Supreme Court’s pending 
decision in ​Van Buren v. United States​, which will probably be decided in 2021.   In ​Van Buren​,​ ​the 50
accused was a police officer who accessed a police database for an “improper purpose”; that is, not 
for any policing related work but to sell information from the database to a third party. The third 
party turned out to be part of an FBI sting operation, and the accused was convicted of a felony 
under section 1030(a)(2). The Eleventh Circuit upheld the conviction and the accused has now 
appealed to the Supreme Court. The Court must decide whether the accused, in accessing the 
database for improper purposes, “exceeded authorized access.” 
In short, the Supreme Court has the opportunity to resolve the circuit split over how to apply this 
language in section 1030(a)(2), endorsing either a narrow or broader interpretation, and creating 
greater certainty in the CFAA’s application. The decision would likely also impact other interpretive 
issues under the CFAA, such as whether a mere TOS violation can constitute access “without 
authorization” for the purposes of other subsections in the anti-hacking statute. 
How will ​Van Buren​ be decided? In our view, the Ninth Circuit’s more narrow construction of the 
CFAA, as articulated in ​Nosal I​, is more faithful to the CFAA’s original and central focus as an 
anti-hacking statute. As the court in ​Nosal I​ noted, Congress enacted the CFAA “primarily to 
address the growing problem of computer hacking,” and a narrow interpretation that focused on 
hacking and bypassing technological barriers would be more consistent with that focus “rather than 
49 ​Xiao, Qixue, et al. "Security risks in deep learning implementations." ​2018 IEEE Security and Privacy 
Workshops (SPW)​. IEEE, 2018. 
50 Van Buren v. United States, 940 F.3d 1192 (11th Cir. 2019), petition for cert. filed (U.S. Dec. 18, 2019) (No. 
19-783) (pending decision on appeal). 
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turning [the CFAA] into a sweeping Internet-policing mandate.”  A broader CFAA interpretation 51
effectively criminalizes contractual breach, by turning breaches of TOS or other common private 
computer use policies, into criminal violations. This would mean, the court notes, that “millions of 
unsuspecting individuals would find that they are engaging in criminal conduct.”  In other words, a 52
narrow construction is more consistent with the CFAA’s original aims and also avoids a troubling 
outcome wherein internet users are criminally liable for simple TOS violations that most people 
commit every day, knowingly or not. 
If we are correct and the Supreme Court follows the Ninth Circuit’s narrow construction, this will 
have important implications for adversarial ML research. In fact, we believe that this will lead to 
better security outcomes in the long term. First, if ML security researchers and industry actors 
cannot rely on expansive TOS to deter against certain forms of adversarial attacks, then this should 
provide a powerful incentive to develop more robust technological and code-based measures to 
protect against such attacks. And with a more narrow construction of the CFAA, ML security 
researchers will be less likely chilled from conducting tests and other exploratory work on ML 
systems, again leading to better security in the long term.  
Second, even if TOS can be relied on, they are unlikely to deter truly bad actors. Average users do 
not read TOS, and more sophisticated adversaries are unlikely to be deterred from attacks simply 
by a clause in a computer use policy. As such, these policies and contractual measures provide 
little proactive protection against adversarial attacks, while often deterring legitimate researchers 
from either testing systems or reporting results. However, the actors ​most ​likely to be deterred are 
ML security researchers who ​would​ pay attention to TOS and may be chilled from research due to 
fear of CFAA liabilities.  On this angle of view, expansive terms of service may be a legalistic form 53
of security theater: performative, providing little actual security protection, while actually chilling 
practices that may lead to better security.  
Third, at most, a broad interpretation of the CFAA on this count may provide after-the-fact avenues 
for loss or damage recovery, but there are already existing legal options. Though remedies are 
certainly different, victims suffering damages or losses suffered due to a TOS violation can seek 
redress under state laws, such as civil claims for breach of contract or tortious interference, for 
example. In short, there are good and compelling reasons as to why the CFAA should remain a 
federal anti-hacking statute not a sweeping anti-competition statute. And this may, in the long run, 
lead to better adversarial ML security research and outcomes.  
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